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CHAPTER 1 
INTROOUCllON 
The purpose is to determine the impact on employees involved in a corporate 
divestiture. The hypothesis is to test the negative impact of a corporate divestiture 
on employee morale and therefore its effect on the corporation and its image. The 
research methodology includes interviewing representative groups of both former 
and existing AT&T management employees, in order to assess employee; feelings, 
perceptions, viewpoints, opinions and reactions of those employees that experienced 
and survived the split up of the "Bell System", more commonly know as the AT&T 
Divestiture and the related subsequent downsizing. 
The intent is to focus on the human element, the emotional impact on 
employees as individuals. 
Qualitative 
I believe that the only way to find out how people feel about an issue is to ask 
them directly. I use the direct approach in gathering the raw data for this thesis 
because I believe that it is insightful, honest and therapeutic. Being an AT&T 
employee both during and after the divestiture, I read and was aware of many of the 
speculations involving the impact of divestiture on customer service, cost of the 
service, technology, collective bargaining agreements, union membership, etc. 
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However, I always wondered "what about use"? Why was it no one ever 
bothered to ask the tens of thousands of management emplovees how th~y felt, or 
what they thought about the whole thing? They has something valuable to offer, only 
no one bothered to ask and certainly no one bothered to listen when those 
employees tried to express their thoughts and feelings. I am certainly one of those 
employees. I firmly believe that if our opinions and feelings had been solicited and 
valued, the corporation would have benefited and eliminated years and moneys 
wasted in ''trial and error" methodologies. Additionally, I believe that there is a hard 
dollar value in going to the "source". The "source" being those employees with 
experience and knowledge of the Bell System. There is hard dollar value to 
cauterizing the emotional wounds that these employees, to this day, harbor because 
of the insensitive manner in which upper management has dealt with them. The hard 
dollar value can be seen in issues of morale, productivity, teamwork, economies of 
scale and the synergy that are inherent to these high performance teams. In the fall 
of 1992, I interviewed 18 current and former AT&T employees. With their 
permission, these interviews were audio taped. I attempted to interview an equal 
number of males and females. The Figures on the following pages provide other 
demographic information regarding the subjects. 
Table 1 
GEl'DER 
Table Female Male 
18 7 11 
Table 2 
EMPLOYMENTSTATIJS 
Total Former Employees Current Employees 
18 7 14 
I designed and used the same questionnaire in all of the interviews. The 
questionnaire provided me with uniformity and was s a tool for focusing on: 
• the individual 
• their career/job expectations 
• source of those expectations 
• their actual career path 
• how they felt the company treated them before and after divestiture. 
Appendix 1 is a copy of the questionnaire. Appendix 2 is a copy of the Permission 
Form that only one person chose to sign. However, I did offer it to all eighteen 
individuals. I asked 20 people to participate in this project, however, two declined to 
be interviewed. The two who declined to participate in the interviews felt that they 
mostly had negative information to share with me. They felt that, regardless of my 
assurances of confidentiality, their managers would find out they had participated 
therefore, placing their jobs in jeopardy. These two individuals also had less than one 
year of service with the company and I believe they felt more vulnerable regarding 
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AT&T was incorporated in 1885, but its history begins with Alexander 
Graham Bell's invention of the telephone in 1876. AT&T was the parent company of 
the Bell System, and its primary mission was to provide universal telephone service -
service to virtually everyone in the United States. In its first 50 years, AT&T 
established subsidiaries and allied companies in more than a dozen other countries. It 
sold its international interests in 1925 and focused on achieving its mission in the 
United States. It did, however, continue to provide international long distance 
service.1 
The Bell System was dissolved at the end of 1983 with AT&T's divestiture of 
the Bell telephone companies. Today AT&T operates worldwide with employees in 
almost 100 countries. Its global operations function in competitive, high technology 
markets. AT&T is the most widely-held stock in the United States. 
As of November, 1993, AT&T employed approximately 308,700 employees 
worldwide. In a 1995, AT&T employed 309,00 people. 
Almost from its inception, AT&T was identified with an uncommon 
mission and pursued that mission with exceptional integrity. For those who 
1 AT&TFSCT BOOK. 1992 
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Bell System, the concept of public interest involved above all the twin goals of 
universal availability and superior quality. These goals were the 
motivating vision of all its laws, the common understanding that linked its 
employees in their dedication to the famous ··spirit of service" - a phrase 
deriving from an early and exemplary episode in the Systems history that fixed 
the service standard permanently in the corporate culture.2 
AT&T is the largest telecommunications company in the United States and a 
worldwide leader in information technology. Its main businesses include long-distance 
telephone service, integrated communications and computer solutions, telephone 
network switching and transmission equipment, and customer premises equipment.3 
AT&T is a global company that provides communications services and 
products, as well as network equipment and computer systems, to businesses 
consumers, telecommunications service providers and government agencies. It's 
worldwide computerized intelligent network carries more than 125 million voice, data, 
video and facsimile messages every business day (as of 3/92), AT&T Bell Laboratories 
engages in basic research as well as product and service development. In addition, 
AT&T offers a general purpose credit card, as well as financial and leasing services.4 
AT& T's present business is divided into five major groups. They are communications 
products, communications services, network equipment, credit card and computer 
technology. Only its long distance operation remains under government regulation. 
2 W. Brooke Tunstall, Disconnection Parties (McGraw Hill, 1985) 
3 The Froehlick/Kent Encyclopedia of Telecommunications, vol. 1, (Marcel Dekker, Inc., 
1991) 
4 AT&T FACT BOOK, last updated March, 1992, by AT&T: AT&T Archives. 
With 2.4 million registered shareholders, AT&T is the most widely held stock in 
America. 5 
Some AT&T "Firsts" 
AT&T has a rich history surrounding research, development and Bell Labs. 
AT&T and it's employees were extremely proud of the AT&Ts reputation and 
tradition Bell Labs. That pride came from being the "first" to invent or discover 
technological present breakthroughs in communications. The nine Nobel prizes in 
science that were awarded to Bell Labs scientists served as proof positive to the 
world of what AT&T employees already knew regarding its excellence in technology. 
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The following are some examples of AT&T being the "first" to discover, invent 
or apply new technologies such as : 
• Commercial trans-Atlantic telephone service (1927) 
• Electrical digital computer ( 1937) 
• Transistor (1947) 
• Laser ( 1958) 
• Communications satellite, Telstar (1962) 
• Commercial lightwave system (1977) 
• Karmarkar linear programming algorithm (1987) 
• Commercial ISDN long distance network service (1988) 
• Optical digital processor (1990) 
• Full-color, motion videophone that operates on regular phone lines 
( 1992 )6 
j Ibid. 
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AT& T's Mission 
"We are dedicated to being the world's best at bringing people together --
giving them easy access to each other and to the information and services they want 
-- anytime, anywhere."7 
AT&T's Anti-Trust History 
At the turn of the century, a several times reorganized Bell System, which 
also had acquired manufacturer Western Electric, became known as American 
Telephone and Telegraph. AT&T began buying small competitors and in 1909 
purchased controlling interest in Western Union. In 1910, the Interstate Commerce 
Commission was appointed to oversee wire and radio communication.8 
Three years later in 1913, the Kingsbury Commitment put a stop to AT&T's 
attempt to single-handedly take over the industry. The Company was ordered to 
divest its Western Union holdings, stop acquiring Independent local phone companies 
without government permission and interconnect its lines freely with any company 
that wanted network access. 9 In effect, AT&T escaped antitrust prosecution by 
submitting itself to government supervision. AT&T learned to cultivate the benevolent 
image of Ma Bell.10 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ann Lindstrom, "Telcom History," Telephony H, v220,n24 (June, 1991):29. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Peter Coy, "AT&T Bares Its Tech.; It Says It Will Make A Hostile Bid For Balky NCR," 
Business Week. 17 December 1990, 24 
I I 
The Department of Justice filed an antitrust suit against AT&T and Western 
Electric in 1949. The resulting 1956 Consent Decree. allowed AT&T to keep Western 
Electric restricted the Company to provide only regulated common carrier services. 
In March 1974, MCI filed an antitrust suit against AT&T. Later that same 
year, the U.S. Department of Justice filed an antitrust suit of its won, charging the 
Bell System with illegally restricting competition and monopolizing the marketplace. 
The breakup came approximately seven years later. AT&T fought the lawsuit on the 
battle field of the Feral courts, the FCC, and Congress. After 1 O months of trial and 
$00 million in court and legal costs, AT&T's CEO, Charles Brown, settled with the 
government. 
The task of restructuring proved far more difficult than almost anyone 
has expected. Senior management had definite ideas of where it wanted 
AT&T to go, but transforming the lifelong habits and work patterns of 
373,000 employees (prior to divestiture, AT&T had close to 1 million 
employees, the majority of them went with the Bell Operating Companies) in 
an entrenched bureaucracy was no easy task. That the Company had to 
change its orientation was expressed clearly in dozens of AT&T publication 
and forums. AT&T was no longer the telephone company, but a corporation 
in the competitive information movement and management business. But no 
comparable mission to universal service could be articulated. The dirty work 
of tearing apart Ma Bell was left to the same people who had put it 
together.11 
Downsizing History 
Charles Brown was the Chairman and CEO of AT&T from 1979 until 1986. 
Mr. Brown had been responsible for steering AT&T through the initial phases of 
divestiture. He retired in 1986 and was succeeded by James E. Olson. Mr. Olson died 
in office in 1988 and was succeeded by Robert E. Allen. Mr. Olson's death was 
ll Ann Lindstrom, "Telcom History" Telphony H, v220.n24.(June. 1991};29. 
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another below that came on the heels of the divestiture and the first downsizings 
that the Bell System had ever experienced. In addition, his death added to the 
uncertainty that stockholders were already experiencing and that was reflected in 
the price of AT&T stock. Mr. Olson was a charismatic and very public representative 
of AT&T. He had been expected to be the steady force that would guide AT&T 
through the first few years of uncertainty. Employees, stockholders, the Board of 
Directors, stock analysts, etc., had relied on his rock steady leadership, therefore his 
quickly deteriorating health and subsequent death due to cancer, was a shock to 
everyone. 
Bob Allen in the first year after his sudden elevation to CEO, pursued the 
strategies formulated by Olson, while adding some new and in some ways tougher, 
ideas. Het defined the work force in July 1988, by coupling a company wide hiring 
freeze with programs that shifted over 2,000 staff managers into sales positions. He 
sponsored acquisitions of companies and other assets, such as GTE's switching 
business and the Paradyne Corp., makers of data communications equipment, NCR, a 
computer company, and McCaw , cellular services. 
In February 1989, AT&T began additional restructuring. The Company 
reorganized four major business units within AT&T, into smaller business units so that 
accountability an decision making would be pushed down the organization, closer to 
the customer. 12 
12 The Froehlick/KentEncyclopedia of Telecommunications, vol.1, (Marcel Dekker, 
Inc.,1991) 
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The following are some facts and figures around divestiture:13 




AT&T offers early retirement to 13,000 people in order to 
streamline the worK force. 
For the first time it its history, AT&T announces a freeze on 
the salary structure of all its managers, a move affecting 
114,000 employees. 
In connection with the 20% cost reduction program AT&T 
announces that 11,000 positions will be eliminated in AT&T 
Technologies sector. AT&T offers early retirement to many 
senior officers. 
AT&T continues to reduce costs by closing plants and cutting 
jobs, nearly 15,000 this year alone.14 
Olson had continued, but accelerated Brown's plans to reduce and redeploy 
the work force, to shift company focus from internal questions to customer needs, 
and to seek relief from regulations.15 
In 1989, the biggest impact on the bottom line came from full scale cost 
reduction programs. The redeployment of 1,900 people from administrative and 
13W. Brooke Tunstall, Disconnecting Parties (McGraw Hill, 1985) 
14Peter Coy, "AT&T Bares Its Tech,; It Says It Will Make a Hostile Bid For Balky NCR," 
Business Week, 17 December 1990. 
15 The FroeWick/Kent Encyclopedia of Telecommunications, vol.l, (Marcel Kekker, In., 
1991) 
staff work to front line sales jobs helped. So did a hiring freeze and stringent cost 
controls. Redeployment was an effort to increase market coverage. 16 
14 
In 1991, AT&T's Computer Systems unit, which at that time employed 7,500 
people worldwide, was phased out after the acquisition of NCR. NCR recruited a 
majority of AT&T Computer Systems' 3,900 U.S. management employees. Of 
Computer Systems' 3000 mom-management employees, NCR it was thought would 
recruit about 600 people. The business forecast called of AT&T to retain another 
600 for the purposes of maintaining computer equipment for the phone company.17 
Since 1984, the union lost over 100,000 jobs "with no end in sight". The 
new technology could ultimately replace half of the 17,000 AT&T operators. At the 
time of divestiture AT&T employed 50,000 operators.18 
Michael Kennedy of Arthur D. Little says much of the improvement at AT&T 
reflects not new business but its steep cost cuts, and he warns that ''you can't 
downsize forever. Sooner or later, you must find new sources of revenue".19 There 
comes a point in time where continued cost cuts can in effect cost the Company 
more in money, business and employee morale. At some point employee morale can be 
translated into "hard dollars". These hard dollars are evident when a Company 
experience a loss in efficiency or a loss in business due to the poor morale of its 
employees. 
16Hereschel L. Johnson, Focus (AT&T Pulication, May 1989). 
17Work-group Computing Report, AT&T-NCR: AT&T Support Program For Employees 
Affected By NCR Merger (V@ N63), 17_ 
18 EDGE, on and about AT&T, Voice Recognition: The Human Cost: AT&T Automates 
Long Distance (v7 nl89) 
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A perfect example of this is the February 1990 failure of AT&T network. 
The failure resulted in 5.5 million calls being blocked during the network "outage". 
Due to downsizing over the years, a network node in New York was reduced to a 
skeleton staff. Of what were left approximately half were in training that day and 
some of the others had they had been declared surplus. Those that were surplus 
had been given instructions, as is the practice in these circumstances to find 
themselves a job within the next "x" amount of days IF they failed to find a job by the 
"off payroll" date, their employment would be terminated in accordance to the 
surplus declaration. At the time of the outage, because of the reduced staff, no one 
had been around to ensure that the alarm systems and backup systems tested and 
working. In addition, their was no one on duty when some of the alarms did go off. 
This network failure resulted in the loss of some business for AT&T. This proved to be 
a classic example of cost reductions going to far and having negative effects on the 
bottom line in the long run. 
Personal History 
I have been employed with AT&T since June, 1981. I was hired by Illinois Bell 
in 1981 into the Sales/Marketing organization. Unbeknownst to me. the hiring of 
people specifically for sales and marketing was a historical happening in the Bell 
system. Up until 1981, there had never been a "real" sales or marketing 
organization with the Bell system. According to those employees that had been 
"around" the Bell system for 25 years or so, there had never been a need to sell 
AT&T or Bell systems products and services. The Bell system had been a monopoly 
19 John J. Keller, "Some AT&T Clients Gripe That Cost Cuts Are Hurting Service," Wall 
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and therefore were the only game in town. A customer would call up and say "I need 
a phone line". From there the Bell system took over, they determined what you 
needed, when and how it would be installed, and how it would be billed. The only. 
decisions the customer would make were where to send the bit color phones, either 
beige or black phones. 
When I was hired I 1981, AT&T had just begun to experience competition in 
the equipment market. The equipment market was the market for commercial phone 
systems, communication equipment for businesses, government, schools, etc. I was 
hired by Illinois Bell, which was know as the local Exchange Company " (lEC) or the 
Bell Operating Company (BOC). As a lEC it was responsible for phone equipment for 
both the residential and commercial sector within its boundaries and for local phone 
service. It was not involved with long distance service. AT&T long lines was the sole 
carrier of long distance throughout the United States. 
At the time I was hired, all the lEC's were hiring new people for sales and 
marketing. We were hired to work in specific industries. For example, sine I had 
previously worked for an insurance company, I was hired to work in the Insurance 
Industry. Illinois Bell had a sales office that dealt only with the Insurance companies. 
There were also among others sales groups that dealt only in Finance, 
Petro/Chemical, Hospitality, Retail, etc. The theory was that the more we knew 
about a specific industry we could more professionally and efficiently deal with the 
specialized communication needs of that industry and those customers. 
Street, 24 January 1992, p. l 
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I had a sales module that had a number of insurance accounts in it which 
represented $3 million in annual revenue to Illinois Bell. My job was to upgrade their 
equipment to the newer generations of communications equipment, find new · 
applications for Bell products and services, keep customers from going to the 
competition and bring back customers that had gone to the competition. My bag of 
products and services consisted of phone system that ranged from mechanical 
phones to computerized phone systems, computer peripherals. and local phone 
service. At the end of the year we were measured on how much new revenue we had 
been able to stimulate in our module. 
My accounts were typically national accounts (i.e. New York Life, Mass. 
Mutual, Aetna, etc. ) that had local presence in the state of Illinois. I was responsible 
for all of their locations within the state. 
In late 1982, as part of the divestiture of the Bell system, each employee 
was asked to chose whether they wanted to stay with the LEC, (i.e. Illinois Bell, etc.) 
or transfer to the new AT&T entity American Bell. American Bell's mission was to sell 
and service equipment. AT&T Long Lines was still responsible for long distance. In 
essence American Bell would now compete with the LEC's and other phone equipment 
vendors for the same customers and the same market. 
I chose to go with the new Company American Bell and I was transferred to 
AT&T American Bell in January 1983. A year later American Bell was renamed AT&T 
Information Systems, more commonly referred to as AT&T IS. The name had to be 
changed because after a long and brutal battle over the use of the "Bell" name and 
18 
logo between AT&T and the LEC's, Judge Greene ruled that the LECs would have sole 
rights to the "Bell" name and logo, except for Bell Labs. I chose to go with American 
Bell because I bought into the spiel that it represented a "new challenge", the 
adventure of "uncharted waters", our contribution to "history". 
No one mentioned the frustrations, the intimidation, the brow beating, the 
lack of support, lack of supplies and the proliferation of managers with no mores, 
principals, or ethics. I wasn't prepared for the outright viciousness, lies and total lack 
of direction or support that we confronted at every turn. 
With American Bell and AT&T IS the type and mixture of products and 
services were sold changed a little. First of all the market changed. The industry 
specific approach was still there, but only for the larger customers, customers that 
were established and had more that approximately 100 phones. A new approach 
was established to deal with the smaller end of the market, those with less than 100 
phones. This sector was called GBCS (General Business Communications Systems). I 
was transferred, not by choice into this market from the national Insurance industry. 
After several months of stumbling and experimenting with different way of 
servicing this market, it was decided to use the zip-code method. Each account 
executive was given a certain number of zip-codes that represented X amount of 
existing revenue and had what the market analysts predicted was X amount of 
revenue potential. Zip-coded based territories also meant that you had any and 
every type of business in that territory and that we had to learn how to sell in a 
different way. Each account Executive was basically their own small business. 
20 
of dollars per year, but was not used by the end user, because it was too 
cumbersome or awkward for them to use. Technically the systems were state of the 
art, but practically they were not usable. 
I was hired because my interpersonal and negotiating skills would enable me 
to function as liaison between the technical people and the end user. The 
programmers and project managers had outstanding technical skills, but could not 
communicate without getting into verbal and hostile confrontations with the 
customers, the end users. The end users felt that the technical people were 
designing systems that could not be used, were not listening to the customer, and 
talked down to them. Additionally, the customer was billed for these systems and 
services. My technical knowledge of voice and data communications enabled me to 
understand and operate in the technical realm of the programmers and project 
managers. 
I was sent to Stevens Institute of Technology in Hoboken, N.J. and to Bell 
Labs for training in Human Factors Engineering. I was given whatever training I 
needed and any type of computer software and hardware necessary to do the job. 
In addition to tools and training, I was even approached by my management and a 
career path was mutually discussed , designed and encouraged. 
In 1987, as part of my career path and with the support of my local 
management team, I transferred into the much coveted Corporate Human Resources 
group. Specifically, I was now in the Management Staffing group. My job was to staff 
or fill jobs for the corporate headquarters Network Engineering Group. At the time I 
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joined Management Staffing, the networking engineering group had just announced 
plans to accelerate the "digitization" of the entire AT&T network. This meant that 
instead of converting the entire network from analog to a 99.9% digital network in 
ten years, it would not be done in two to three years. My responsibility was to staff 
the 500 jobs in the New Jersey area that were needed in order to make the 
accelerated schedule a reality. 
In late 1988, competition was killing AT&T in the marketplace. In addition, 
newer and faster technologies were being introduced into the work environment, 
which replaced head count in many labor intensive areas. Management realized one 
of the reasons AT&T was being clobbered in the marketplace was attributable to the 
fact there were not enough salespeople in the field to interact with the customers. 
The competition successful because it used an "in your face" approach with the 
customers. They were visibly knocking on doors, at Chamber of Commerce meetings, 
at street fairs, etc.. The competition was making their presence known. instead of 
"knee jerk" reacting and en masse hiring thousands of new sales and sales support 
people in the marketing business unit, and downsizing people in other business units, 
AT&T decided to implement a redeployment strategy. In other words, AT&T 
employees were given first opportunity to fill these sales and sales support jobs. 
In theory this was an excellent move, the redeployment also gave employees 
the opportunity to move anywhere in the Company with fill company relocation 
benefits. However, in practice many employees were forced to take these jobs for a 
variety of reasons. For example, poor performers in some areas were massively 
"dumped" into these jobs, it gave their managers a way of getting rid" of 
performance and personality problems without confronting them. in early December, 
1988. I was offered a promotion in the Human Resources group in New Jersey. 
However, in late December, 1988, before the promotion was formally announced, due 
to a serious illness in my family, I turned down the promotion and "redeployed" into a 
technical sales support job in Chicago. 
My job was to assist the Account Executive in selling network services to 
high end customers by providing the technical expertise. Once the sale was made, I 
was responsible for the implementation and installation of the services. I was in this 
job for two years. Even though it was a financially rewarding position, I never felt it 
was a good personality match for me. In addition, my manager and I had severe 
personality/workstyle clashes, which we were never able to resolve. In January, 
1991, I jumped at the chance to transfer into a sale job in the Commercial Markets 
group in Chicago. This job was similar in function to the GBCS job, however, instead 
of phone equipment I would be selling network long distance services to smaller 
customers. The sales modules were constructed geographically by zip code. 
In January, 1992, I was lucky enough to be selected from 110 applicants for 
a job opening in the EC/Diversity organization. My career goals had always been to 
be a Human Resources professional, I was finally able to make the move back into HR. 
My job h been reactive and proactive in nature. On the reactive end, I investigate 
Title VII charges of discrimination when employees either come to our group to file an 
internal charge or if they chose to file externally with a state of federal agency. On 
the proactive side, I counsel both managers and employees on a variety of HR related 
issues and conduct Diversity and EO awareness workshops. 
At the time I was hired by Illinois BelL in 1981, I was employed at an 
Insurance company. I remember that at the time my resignation was announced, 
numerous people independently congratulated me and said I would never have to 
worry about job security, benefits or pay again, and that I now "had it made". To a 
person, they asked me who I knew at Bell, because everyone knew that you couldn't 
get a job with Ma Bell unless you knew someone. All this was news to me. Many years 
later I realized that my enculturalization into the Bell System had started with those 
innocent comments. 
During the interviewing process at Illinois Bell, I was told that if hired, I would 
be part of the "new wave" of specialized people hire for new sale,marketing jobs. in 
addition, I was told that Illinois Bell rarely hired "off the street" and that was one of 
the lucky ones to have gotten so far in the hiring process. Those that were hired 
would undergo an intensive twelve week training program {Phase I). Every test 
administered would be an opportunity for the new hires to either prove themselves, 
or to be eliminated from the program and employment with the Bell System. If we 
passed Phase I, we would than be sent to Phase II training at the new Sales University 
training center in Denver, Co. At Phase II training, we would ;meet and train with 
other new hires from the other Bell companies across the country. 
Every Illinois Bell employee {Account Executive) that was sent to Denver for 
Phase II training was given a burgundy colored, expandable back, leather brief case. 
The brief case has a distinctive style to it. This brief cased would always identify an 
Illinois Bell Account Executive. 
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Two things in particular stand out about my first day with Illinois Bell. First. 
we were told that there was no such thing as a sick day at Illinois Bell. Employees 
were given awards for perfect attendance. I was astounded, at the company I had 
previously worked for as a supervisor, its non-management force was represented by 
the Teamsters union. In their collective bargaining agreement members were 
allowed/entitled to X number of sick days per year, which most employees used as 
vacation days. The presenter went on to describe the type of awards for 1 year, 5 
years, etc., for perfect attendance. Secondly, a very clear distinction was made 
between management employees and "craft". I didn't realize until many months later 
that she was referring to occupational or union represented employees. The 
enculturation process had started immediately. 
On the second day of training we were each given our own copy of John 
Malone's book, Dress For Success, other wise know as "DFS". A serious lecture 
accompanied the book. in addition, as new employees were offered a loan through 
the Illinois Bell credit union, in order to purchase the proper "DFS" wardrobe. We 
were given until the next Monday morning to assemble our wardrobe. 
I remember that the Vice President of Sales in the Central Region, Bernie 
Sergesketter, came in to address our training group and emphasize DFS. Dressing 
for success was a condition of employment. Several months later I wore a 
conservative business dress to the office o on a blistering hot summer day, when I 
knew that I was not going to see any customers. My manger called me into his office 
10 minutes after I arrived at the office to reprimand me for wearing a dress. I 
dressed strictly according to the DFS rules for the next six years. For women DFS 
was particularly difficult because business suites for women were just being 
introduced in the retail market. It was difficult to find suits that fit properly and the 
few that you could find were extremely expensive. I go to a department store and if I 
heard a female customer instructing the saleswomen in particular requirements for 
the cut and colors of the suit I immediately knew that she had been indoctrinated in 
DFS. 
We were trained to not wear rings on more than one finger and for the 
women not to wear any necklaces. We were instructed to not carry loose change in 
our pockets because it was distracting, especially during a customer presentation. 
We were encouraged to master the art of writing on a flip chart without turning our 
back to the audience. 
According to management they wanted the sales force to present a 
polished, professional and uniform image to the world. Management did leave Anne 
room for individual expression and that still operated with the Bell System cookie 
cutter mentality. They were striving for a recognizable appearance that screamed 
AT&T to the customer. A look that was professional and instantly recognizable as 
AT&T. Personally, I always thought their techniques went overboard and resulted in 
Gestapo-like treatment of employees. 
For me the enculturation process was both formal and informal. It was 
formal in the factual stories relayed through various company employee publications. 
Informal the storytelling told at lunch time, around the conference table, etc. 
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After six morith8 of intensive training we were sent to our res;::iective offices. 
Every few weeks or months the same training class or group would be reassembled 
for additional training. By this time, after eight months of training "our class" had 
formed a tight bond. We became not only a support group for each other at work, 
but also friends that socialized outside of work on a regular basis. This bonding was 
true of every "class" that came out of the training center. From June of 1981 
through June of 1983, Illinois Bell had a new "class or wave" of off-the-street hires 
that started every four months. The other BOC's (Bell Operating Companies) had 
similar schedules. 
Historically the BOC's always operated in a similar and uniform fashion of the 
sake of consistency and because the customers made market place demanded it. It 
was also a case of security, the Bell system provided the government (the White 
House, the Pentagon, NASA, etc. ) with its communication systems, therefore, it was 
necessary that they operate uniformly to a degree as a matter of national security. 
In addition, it was also a case of economies of scale, the Denver Sales 
Training Center was funded by all of the BOC's and the curriculum was the same for 
all new sales people. 
The Company was in fact creating a new culture of employees. This new 
culture and support group, became necessary when we reported to our job 
locations. As new employees we were resented by other employees. We all had 
college degrees, at least 25% of us had graduate degrees. None of us had come up 
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through the ranks. Most of the existing management employees in marketing had 
come up through the ranks. The men had historically gone form military service 
straight to Illinois Bell. Some of them had worked for Illinois Bell before going into the 
Service. After the service they were hired as installers, pole climbers(non-
management jobs), etc. They had progressed through the ranks and were now 
management employees. 
The women had historically been hired as either telephone operators or in 
the customer billing organizations (non-management jobs). In the 1970's a class 
action lawsuit had been filed against AT&T on the basis of sex discrimination. It was 
actually initiated by a woman in Bell Labs who had a Ph.D. degree and was not given 
the same opportunities, promotions, assignments, etc., as her male counterparts. 
The resulting Consent Decree gave women the opportunity to move into 
management positions and other historically male dominated fields within AT&T. 
The Consent Degree resulted in mass promotions of women into management 
jobs, regardless of their experience, level and type of education, abilities or skills. 
Therefore, when I came into the Company I noticed and it was pointed out to me that 
many women in responsible positions with atrocious reputations for not being able to 
perform the job and lacking both interpersonal as well as basic communication skills. 
Of course, the men failed to point out the women that were doing outstanding jobs 
and were a credit not only to women in general, but to their organizations and 
themselves. I'm certain that many of the women were both consciously and 
subconsciously set up for failure by their organizations and local management teams. 
The failure to support them was manifested in lack of training, lack of hones 
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communications with them about their shortcoming, and what was expected of them, 
etc. 
The poor female role models that were pointed out to the female new hires, 
simply made it harder for us to fit into the organization. We had to work twice as 
hard as our male peers in order to be accepted and respected as professionals. 
The resentment against the new hires was based on the existing employees 
perception that we had not "earned our stripes". It had taken them 15- 20 years to 
get their positions and we were marching the street with a couple of months 
training and presuming to be their peers. In addition, they were expected to teach 
us "the ropes". 
These employees made things very tough for us, they had an in-depth 
knowledge of the products, services and the Company mission that we simply did not 
have. However, we did not have the same job security, complacency, and entitlement 
that they had. 
I learned of their resentment, pride in the Company, spirit of service, support 
network of resources, family, and friends through the stories they told. The stories 
were told everywhere, standing around someone's desk, at lunch, on the drive out to 




As Bell engineers drove on to advance all areas of communications with these 
newest techniques and computer people pushed to the frontiers of their possibilities, 
it soon became clear that the previously separate technologies of communications 
and computing were converging. Both were needed to build efficient systems in with 
field. Switching machines looked more and more like computers, and computers 
needed electrical linkage to integrate far-flung operations.20 
It's service performance was excellent in every dimension, and prospects for 
continued growth were good. In fact, such growth in the industry was in contrast to 
many other important sectors of an economy undergoing long-term recession. To 
some it did not seem fair that a vigorous area of economic activity should remain 
closed to newcomers. 21 
20 H.M. Bottinger, The Telephone Book, (New York: Steam Publishers Ltd. 1983) 
21 Ibid. 
There were two fundamental doctrines on which the nation's entire 
communications system had been built 1) technological experience and 2) price 
structure.22 
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As part of a public interest undertaking, telephone companies took 
responsibility , and were ordered to do so by the commissions, for the entire 
responsibility . The various telephone companies had resisted, out of experience 
extending back to the earliest days, any attempts to connect apparatus not made or 
approved by themselves to the network they had constructed. "Foreign 
attachments" was the name used to describe such devices. Regulators generally 
endorsed this view over the years, since they wished responsibility for quality placed 
squarely on someone who could be held accountable.23 
However, as the urge to exploit and profit from electronic technology 
became stronger, many potential manufacturers felt the prohibitions were excessive 
and set about challenging them with the commissions and in the courts In addition, 
they also challenged the federal and state approved practice which made the sale of 
non-AT&T apparatus whose attachment to the AT&T network was, at the time, illegal. 
During the New Deal era, one of the many new federal agencies that 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt established to deal with and help prevent national 
crisis, such as those that faced the nation during and subsequent to the Great 
Depression of 1929, was the Federal Communications Commission. The FCC was 
established in 1934 and was charged with the task of regulating and supervising the 
22 Ibid. 
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overall operation of the broadcasting, telephone and telegraph industry. Over time, 
AT&T evolved into a monopoly blessed by both Federal and State regulatory 
commissions. The driving force behind this government sanctioned monopoly was the 
public's interest in high quality and dependable telephone service. Therefore, AT&T 
was ultimately responsible for the entire quality and reliability of the service it 
provided. 
This total responsibility for service meant that AT&T and it's operating 
companies were responsible, end-to-end, for the entire service. Thus, every piece of 
equipment form the lumber for the telephone poles, to the switching systems, to the 
phone in the customer's home or business was the responsibility of AT&T and its 
subsidiaries. 
AT&T successfully argued that it could not be held responsible for the entire 
delivery and maintenance of service if it did not have complete control of every 
aspect of provisioning, delivery, and maintenance, The State and Federal Regulatory 
Commissions wholeheartedly agreed, in the name of public interest. Therefore, 
though it remained a regulated entity, AT&T was granted complete control of end-to-
end telephone service by these commissions. Subsequently, any non-AT&T equipment 
attached to any AT&T product or service was considered a foreign attachment and 
was therefore illegal. 
Though the reasoning was both technically sound and practical, AT&T's 
position encountered much resentment because it was considered by many potential 
23 Ibid. 
entrepreneurs and manufacturers to be inherently monopolistic in nature. These 
manufactures offered to sell their products outright to the consumer, in contrast to 
the log standing utility practice of only seiling the service, but never the equipment 
used to render it. The appeal of ownership versus "perpetual rental" added to its 
persuasion.24 
There is no doubt that the Bell system was caught in a quandary. On the 
one hand it was held accountable to the antitrust laws that forbid monopolies and 
encouraged competition. Yet on the other hand, it was charged with operating a 
public utility enterprise that had been granted the exclusive rights to provide service 
under regulation and that in effect by law, forbade competition. 
Also, under scrutiny and attack was the fundamental doctrine which had 
legitimatize using the high-profit services of business and long distance to subsidize 
basic home services. If those paying the higher profit charges were able to go 
elsewhere for their telecommunication service, they would no longer be subsidizing 
basic home service. If this became the case, then the source of the home subsidy 
would disappear for all 80 million homes (1983) would then have to rise considerably 
in order to make up the difference. Few home customers knew that they enjoyed 
such a subsidy, but businesses and government knew, since they paid what they 
considered to be excessive charges. Manufacturers eager to serve t hem also knew 
and were attracted to the high profit areas. From their viewpoint it was sensible to 
advocate the introduction of competition in communication, for "everyone knew" 
that competition would bring down prices. The simple appeal of this proposal, and its 
24 Ibid. 
powerful resonance with American hostility toward monopoly, presented regulators 
and the Bell System with a serious problem. 
There was a split in attitudes towards two proposals. The first urged that 
customer owned devices be allowed connection to the communications network; the 
second proposed that competitors be allowed to furnish long distance services of 
various kinds. Federal regulators favored removing the barriers, however state 
regulators would be forced to raise home rates continuously as the competitors took 
larger and larger portions of the high profit business as their lucrative target.25 
While seeking to have the federal commission change the rules to permit 
competitive supply, manufacturers and entrepreneurs also had another avenue open 
to them in the antitrust laws. Like regulation, antitrust is a social invention of United 
States of America culture and derives directly from the founding American faith in 
competition as the best guarantee against economic concentrations. Even 
attempting to monopolize or acquire monopoly power incurs severe penalties, and 
any damage proved to have been suffered can be tripled in amount. Suits based on 
antitrust laws are initiated individuals and companies who claim damages or by the 
United States government itself, acting thorough the Department of Justice or the 
FCC. 
In the early 1990's the Bell System had been faced with two antitrust suits. 
In 1956, Bell settled these suits via consent decree. Consent decrees limited the Bell 
Systems scope of operation to only regulated communications. However, it is 
important to note that the Consent Decrees were based on the assumption that 
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communications and computing (i.e. computers, software, artificial intelligence, etc.) 
were separate and distinct disciplines. At this point in time the Belly Systems 
operations were run on mechanical and electro-mechanical systems and equipment. 
As technology developed the distinction between computing and communications 
ceased to exist. Therefore, in order to continue providing service in the present and 
the future, the Belly System could either no longer abide by the restrictions of 
Consent Decrees, or eventually face their complete demise. 
In the early 1970's several companies brought antitrust suits against the 
Bell System, alleging damages sustained from Bell's control of end to end service. 
Mainly, these companies wanted to sell phone equipment to consumers that could 
then be attached to the AT&T/Bell ;communications network. In addition, competitive 
long distance services wanted to "hook up" their service to the Bell Systems network 
switches and central offices. 
All of these allegations of monopoly came to a head during the week of 
Thanksgiving, 197 4, when the Department of Justice began an antitrust suit against 
the Bell System charging that it had monopolized communications markets; 
attempted to restrict and eliminate competition from other common carriers, private 
systems and manufacturers; and required Bell companies to purchase Western 
Electric products. To remedy the alleged violations, the Justice Department 
requested the Bell System be broken up (in other words, divest) into independent 
entities in order to make competition effective in the future. 
35 
A legal battle of unprecedented proportions ensued between the 
Department of Justice and AT&T. Bell replied the case was without merit and that no 
law had been violated. AT&T "obiected to being punished by antitrust litigation. tor 
complying faithfully with the regulatory charter."26 From 1974 to 1981, AT&T's 
communications technology development, as well as computing technology in general, 
continued advancing and eroding the distinction between computers and 
communications. AT&T continued to wage and fight many more private and public 
legal battles, during this same time period. 
After six and a half years, the trial of the United States Vs. AT&T finally began in 
March, 1981 and was presided by Federal Judge Harold H. Greene. The last witness 
testified just before Christmas, 1981. Ten months after the trial began, an out of 
court settlement was reached on January 8, 1982.27 AT&T spent 400 million dollars 
in defending itself against the antitrust suit and in reaching a settlement. 
AT&T Chairman, Charles L. Brown explained why AT&T agreed to settle. he 
explained that the probability was very great that eventually AT&T would have been 
forced to divest itself of the Operating Companies. By settling, AT&T was able to do 
it on its own terms. most significantly, AT&T kept control of its technology by keeping 
Western Electric and Bell Labs. Without these two entities, he believed AT&T would 
have been "gutted" and would have lost its competitive advantage and future. in 
addition, the obsolete constraints of the 1956 Consent Decree were removed. 
26 Ibid. 
27W. Brooke Tunstall, Disconnectini: Parties (McGraw Hill, 1985) 
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Divestiture Facts 
Divestiture meant that twenty two Bell Operating Companies were 
consolidated into several independent local companies whose main mission was to 
provide local service to customers. The new seven companies are USWEST, Pacific 
Telesis, Southwestern Bell Corp. BELLSOUTH, Bell Atlantic, NYNEX, and Ameritech. 
AT&T had been responsible for inventing, developing, installing, servicing, and selling 
both local and long distance phone service and phone equipment. AT&T retained long 
distance equipment.28 Before divestiture: 
• One in ten people in the U.S. worked for AT&T. 
• There were 45,000 suppliers to the Bell System. 
• Only the federal government had more employees. 
• As of 11/93, AT&T had 308,700 employees. There has been a 49% 
reduction in the workforce over the past ten years. 
• Forecasted reduction of the workforce of 25,000 employees in 1994. 
• AT&T owned 24,000 building and had 
• 50,000 phone operators 
• Bell Labs had nine Nobel prizes awarded to its employees and 2,000 of 
them had Ph.D.'s. 
• Bell Labs had averaged one patent per day. 
28 H.M. Boettinger, The Telephone Book (New York, Stearn Publisher Ltd. 1983) 
Total number of AT&T 
employees ................. . 
Bell Lab employees ... . 
Unionized employees. 














1982 was spent planning for the divestiture, 1983 was spent implementing 
it and 1984 was living with it. Ten thousand employees, or one percent of pre-
divestiture employees, worked on the divestiture. At the time of divestiture: 
• 24,000 employees took early retirement 
• 330,000 employees changed companies 
• 70 million customer accounts and 200 million customer records 
would have to be split 
• 177,000 motor vehicles would have to be reassigned31 
In 1991, AT& T's total revenues were 63,089 billion and had total assets of 
$53,355 billion. 
Divestiture Implementation 
AT& T's Office of the Chairman (its top five officers) met with other key 
executives on Monday, January 11, 1982, three days after the settlement had been 
29 As of January, 1983 
30approximately 
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announced to the public, in a day-long session. The meeting began with a review of 
reactions to the settlement by the Corporation's various constituencies. Next the 
possible legal, regulatory, and legislative implications were discussed. Finally, the 
planning and implementation of divestiture was addressed. It was immediately evident 
that the project would have to be managed apart from the day-to-day conduct of 
the business, as it would have to be planned in a new and unaccustomed fashion. It 
was also clear to everyone involved that the entire divestiture effort would be a joint 
effort of AT&T and the Bell Operating Companies. Normal processes were inadequate 
for an effort of such dimensions. 
Six major questions would require answering in order to move forward in 
compliance with Judge Greene's Modification of Final Judgment (MFJ), the Consent 
Decree. These questions were: 
1. What should the structural form of the divested companies be, 
both operationally and financially? 
2. Would prior studies of interexchange/intraexchange divisions 
suffice in carrying out the terms of the decree? 
3. How would the access charge structure be determined? 
4. What market access issues were in store for Western Electric? 
5. How could the Corporation insure that employee and 
shareholder interests were adequately represented? 
6. What organizational framework was required for planning and 
implementing the MFG?32 
31 W. Brook Tunstall, Disconnecting Parties (McGrea-Hill 1985) 
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"Not later than six months after the effective date of Final Judgment 
Defendant AT&T shall submit to the Department of Justice, for its approval, and· 
hereafter implement, a plan of reorganization." In effect the Department of Justice 
had said, "The Bell System will indeed be broken up. Now AT&T, it is incumbent upon 
you to tell us how you will accomplish this Herculean task, for us to approve or 
disapprove."33 AT&T managers would have to develop the plan without the benefit of 
specifications requirements, or even a hint of the scope or content. 
The storyboard for the divestiture was something like this: new, divested 
companies, with anywhere from $15 to $23 billion in assets, would have to 
be launched, 70 million customers accounts, comprising 200 million customer 
records, would have to be split and allotted among new segments of AT&T and 
the relevant regional Bell Operating Companies; 24,000 building and 177,000 
motor vehicles would have to be reassigned; new sales and service offices 
would have to be established, staffed and set in operation across the country; 
136,000 employees would have to be transferred across company borders 
within the Bell system; hundreds of new tariffs would have to be filed with 
regulatory commissions; scores of computerized operational support systems 
would have to be torn apart, redesigned, reprogrammed, tested, and 
debugged; and the remaining AT&T would have to undergo radical 
reorganization.34 
Early in February 1982, a mid-level staff manger named Mike Farmer came to 
s the need for a comprehensive set of divestiture assumptions. Mike had been 
temporarily assigned form Indiana Bell to the AT&T Corporate Planning Division, a 
perfect example of the joint effort between AT&T and the BOC's. Acting on his own, 
he sat down, and analyzed the MFJ paragraph by paragraph, sentence by sentence, 
word by word, extracting every potential nuance of intent and meaning. Form this 




The list was then distributed within .AT&T to a!! departmental subject-matter 
experts (SMEs) in Operations, Finance, Regulatory, Human Resources, Public 
Relations, etc. to comment on, expand, and clarify. Concurrently, the central staffs 
in the Operating Companies were encouraged to engage in the same exercise, viewing 
the MFJ from their own vantage. 
Hundreds of comments, answers, and corrections, rode the returning tide to 
Farmer's desk. Combined, they became part of the critical mass out of which Farmer 
rendered the first rough sketch of the divestiture picture-the initial set of 
assumptions that would drive the management effort for the next two years.35 
There wasn't a formula, a scientific method or a "how to book" did not exist 
for the dismantling of a company the size of AT&T. It wasn't just the size and the 
girth of the Corporation that was overwhelming, though that was certainly daunting. 
But, how did you successfully dismember a Company with one million employees, three 
million stockholders, $150 billion in assets? The real issue was how did you end 
a tradition, how did you tear a family apart, how did you re-invent 
history? 
A single man, Mike Farmer, took the initiative to outline hundreds of 
operational issues an ask the subject matter experts for their input. A single man 
who embodied the spirit of the Bell system took the gargantuan task on himself by 
rolling up his sleeves and stumbling his way through history. 
35 Ibid. 
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The "assumption set" covered every conceivable subject area: public policy. 
organizational srructure, transfer of personnel, division of assets, billing 
arrangements and many more. 
As it was meant to do, the rough sketch drew fire. SMEs, even those who 
had supplied opinions in response to the original questions - objected to, corrected, 
and touched up the finer details here and there, in effect sharpening the focus in 
areas they claimed as their own. The process was working. 
This divestiture assumption set became the core document form which 
planning would proceed. It served as the baseline for other key documents: including 
the Planning Guidelines for Bell Operating Companies, and the Implementation 
Guidelines to be released during late 1982 and early 1983, and the Plan of 
Reorganization that had to be submitted to the Justice Department under the terms 
of the MFJ.36 
People in all parts of AT&T and subsidiaries came together interdisciplinary 
boards, ad hoc committees and task forces to execute the plans and principles 
developed in the first two quarters. In this fashion, a divestiture management 
apparatus took shape. The managerial network that evolved had several significant 
features. One was the spontaneity of its evolution. Although to some degree 
controlled, it grew faster an more effectively than corporate planners could have 
possibly have directed. Another feature was the prevalence of operating company 
36 Ibid. 
people. Throughout the task forces, BOC representative were present in very 
considerable strength to express their views and to influence-- plans and issues 
On August 24, 1982, Judge Greene issued his formal approval of the MFJ. 
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Eight days later, the Restructure Implementation Board (RIB) was convened. The RIB 
was made up of 34 departmental executives from AT&T and an office with divestiture 
responsibility from each BOC region. Meetings were held every other Wednesday 
morning, form September 1982 to December 1983. The following were issues most 
frequently discussed: 
• Access service 
• lntercompany contracts 
• Functional divestiture 
• Procurement 
• Force assignment 
• Plan of reorganization 
• WATTS/800 service 
• Asset assignment 
• 1984 cash flow requirements 
The POR was submitted to Judge Greene on December 16, 1982. On July 8, 
1983, Judge Greene approved the Plan of Reorganization (POR). 
The POR as legal document had to be written by lawyers, interpreted by 
lawyers and approved by lawyers. However, its substance comprised complex 
financial, operational, technical, personnel, and procedural matters all outside the ken 
of most attorneys. Furthermore the POR required the initiation of entirely orir;inal 
management principals in very short order and an internal consistency in the 
document itself that would stand as an extraordinary editorial feat.37 
The divestiture was the result of a settlement between AT&T and the 
Justice Department. In December, 1982, the Chairman of AT&T, Charles Brown, 
agreed to settle the current antitrust lawsuit that the Justice Department had filed 
and was in the middle of trying. 
Unions 
During a 1988, Focus Magazine interview the presidents of AT& T's two 
unions who shared some of their reflections in regards to AT&T divestiture and union 
membership. In 1988 Jack Barry was president of IBEW and Morton Bahr was 
president of the CWA. Both union presidents spoke highly of AT&T in the field of labor 
relations. Bahr "AT&T is one of the few companies that has bitten the bullet and 
recognized that the company and union have the same institutional needs: to grow, 
to be financially stable and create more jobs." 
Barry "Job security is very important: it's the overriding issue. Divestiture 
and off-shore manufacturing are deep concerns of employees. Before divestiture, 
working for AT&T was tantamount to working in the civil service; it was lifetime 
employment. That changed overnight. Barry "Our people need security and we 
prefer to the company profitable to keep our people employed." 
37 Ibid. 
As of April, 1992, unions represented 40% of all AT&T employees or 
approximately 92,000 of the 230,00 AT&T employees as of that year. IBEW has 
represented AT&T employees for 101 years. CWA has represented AT&T employees 
for 45 years. IBEW represents workers in manufacturing, construction and utilities in 
addition to its telecommunications members. The CWA, on the other hand, is the 
telephone union.38 
The union had lost over 100,000 jobs since divestiture in 1984, with what 
they felt was "no end in sight". The new technology in the Operator Services side of 
the house could ultimately replace half of the 17,000 operators that were left.39 As 
far as I've been able to determine, the unions did not play a aggressive role during the 
divestiture process. I believe that this is a result of having to live with the decision to 
divest. Their role has been as always in trying to protect the existing membership, 
which has shrunk dramatically since 1984. The chief union decision makers were kept 
informed of the processes and their input was solicited when appropriate and for the 
sake of goodwill. 
Once the decision of which functions were to remain with AT&T and which 
were to become apart of the BOC's domain, the unions leadership played a key role in 
facilitating this process. 
38Focus, for and of the emplyeesof AT&T, vol. 12, iss 16. 13 September 1988 
39 ~ on and about AT&T, "Voice recognition: the human cost: AT&T automates long 
distance, v7 n189, 2,_ 
CHAPTER4 
ASSESSMENT OF A CULTURE 
Traditional Corporate Culture 
Tunstall accurately describes the pre-divestiture environment, culture and 
character of AT&T and its people. 
Reshaping the corporate culture was ultimately the most difficult task 
confronting AT&T and the divested companies. The Bell System's culture was 
as broad as the enterprise itself; as pervasive and deeply rooted as any value 
system in American business as amorphous , and yet as critical as the 
attitudes, belief structures, and expectations of 1 million employees. The 
culture would have to be reassessed, redefined, d adapted to bring the value 
systems and expectations of AT&T people into congruence with the 
corporation's new mission and to prepare employees for the aggressively 
competitive regions they were entering.40 No useful empirical data existed for 
changing cultural elements. 
"A nations culture resides in the heart and soul of its people" (Mahatma 
Gandhi). A company's culture is a collection of shared values, behavior 
patterns, mores, symbols, attitudes, and normative ways of conducting 
business that, more than its products or services, differentiate it form all 
other companies. Cultural uniqueness is a primary and cherished feature of 
organizations, a critical asset that is nurtured in the internal value system. 
The corporate culture encompasses the very meaning of the organization, 
providing the metabolism and energy that drive it toward its strategic and 
tactical goals.41 
It has been postulated that culture may play as significant a role as either 
strategy or structure in long term performance, especially in the large 
corporate organization experiencing significant changes in its markets and/or 
business environment. AT & T became a virtual laboratory of cultural change in 
real time, not only because of the radical nature of the change imposed, but 
also because of the critically compressed time frame in which the change had 
to occur. Divestiture would forever stand as a unique business event whose 
features were unlikely ever to be duplicated. 
40 W. Brooke Tunstall, Disconnecting Parties, (McGraw Hill, 1985) 
41 Ibid. 
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The numbers of people affected, the sheer size of divested resources, the 
nature of the network, and the historic service relationship between Beli and 
the nation were but so considerations that set it apart from other potential 
corporate rearrangements. The change in business environments for AT&T 
bracketed a very highly competitive one. For decades, AT&T had enjoyed the 
benefits of an extraordinarily strong and productive culture, one deeply 
embedded in its history. 
Bell's traditional culture blended a variety of mutually reinforcing features 
and attributes, the most prominent of which were lifetime career, up from the 
ranks management succession, dedication to customer service, operational 
skills, consensus management, level consciousness and a strong focus on 
regulatory matters. All of these attributes evolved to directly support one 
goal; universal service. Everything related to divestiture was affected by this 
goal; The kind of people hired, their shared value systems, the infrastructure 
of processes to run the business. All were committed to the unchanging 
objective of providing high-quality service at affordable prices to everyone in 
the United States. 
Certain aspects of the culture would have to be nurtured and protected 
through the great transition. These included, most prominently, AT&T's 
historic vision of fairness to employees, owners, and customers; its dedication 
to the service ethic; its mutually reinforcing senses of loyalty and unity; its 
operational and technical skills and concern for safety standards. Cultural 
attributes would have to be adapted as management addressed hidden 
cultural barriers to change.42 
Emerging Culture 
The following excerpt from a speech made by the Executive Vice President of Human 
Resources for AT&T succinctly describes the efforts to purposely create and mold a 
new corporate culture. 
The human goals I want to address are these four 1. accelerate leadership 
development 2. create a climate that fosters a closer relationship between 
labor and management 3. make employee diversity a competitive advantage 4. 
focus on the human value of quality. 
One lesson we have learned in the new world since divestiture is that we 
must commit to continuos improvement, to constant learning in our new 
environment. The old, predictable, sate world is gone. As one observer put it, 
all business faces permanent white water on the journey ahead. There no 
longer are placid inlets or safe harbors to hide. 
Ibid.42 
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Continuing downsizing that the Company sees as a disagreeable business 
necessity handled with compassion and that the unions view as anytnmg 
ranging from unnecessary timed and ill planned . 
... seeking employee input about how to restructure jobs and operations to 
serve customers better. This calls for a different sort of role on the part of 
the unions and the Company. It asks the unions to go beyond their traditional 
role of being of being primarily employee lobbyists and advocates. It seems 
that they become value added suppliers of AT&T's human resources, working 
with the Company to build the best and always up to date talent base in the 
industry, and enabling this talent to satisfy customers superbly, flexibly and at 
a reasonable price. 
The human dimension of quality, I want to talk about quality in terms of 
people rather than process, because it is people who really make quality work 
at AT&T. it is our people who give us competitive advantage, not technology, 
not process, not packaging or styling but the human element. 
We had a sobering reminder back in January 1990, of who fragile 
technology actually is and how important people and a commitment to quality 
are. We pushed the technology envelope on the network to the edge and we 
lost it for several hours. What helped recover from that blow to our image as 
quickly as we seemed to have, was AT&T people and the character they have 
developed in an industry with a tradition of honesty an a strong service ethic. 
It was AT&T people who owned up to the problem, then set about working 
endless days and sleepless nights to find the problem, fix it and prevent it fm 
happening again. In this instance our software failed us, our character did 
not. The power comes from AT&T people who understand our company's 
deeply held commitment to quality and who have a similar depth of personal 
allegiance to the concept. 
For seven hours 5.5 million calls were blocked during the outage. Power 
generation problems knocked out one of AT& T's major switching stations, bringing 
domestic and international service to a standstill in the New York area. Supervisors 
were at fault for failing to check the equipment. The outage resulted in the 
cancellation of more than 500 flights nationwide. 
The outage was so serious that Bob Allen, AT&T's President and CEO, was 
called upon to testify in front of Congress regarding this network failure. It was 
determined that the failure, ultimately was due to human error. 
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No information was ever released as to what action if any was taken against 
these supervisors and technicians. However, a variety of programs have been 
instituted within the Network Services Division to solicit employee input, measure 
employee morale and provide recognition when and where appropriate. 
Personal Comments On Corporate Culture Excerpts 
Regardless of what Tunstall says in his book, Disconnecting Parties, about 
people of AT&T being "bruised but not broken" , the point is that employees were left 
to deal with the emotion, pain, and confusion by themselves. They remained bruised 
and emotionally unhealthy. Tunstall's dismissive attitude typically exemplifies the 
attitude of the upper management team, that still dominated the Company, but at 
least superficially is slowly changing. 
Tunstall can say that there were "actions aimed at reestablishing a sense of 
mission, identity, confidence, and self renewal after the distress of divestiture." But 
the reality is that no measures were put into place to deal with the emotion and the 
grief until the entire AT&T Computer Systems business unit was dismantled in 1991. 
AT that time a variety of employee support systems were first put into place for that 
specific universe. Since then, other business units have begun to use the various 
measures that were introduced by the Computer Systems business unit. 
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Preserving a Culture Through Storytelling 
Previously I mentioned that when I joined the Company. existing employees 
were resentful of the "new wave" of employees hired. I experiences and learned of 
their; resentment, pride in the company, spirit of service, support network of 
resources through the stories they shared. The stories were told everywhere, 
standing around someone's desk, at lunch, on the drive out to see a customer, at 
meeting, etc. The storytelling was done unconsciously, but it honestly convey how 
these employees felt about their company. Even the storytelling process itself was a 
reinforcement of a tradition, a tradition that was followed by example. Stories such 
as: 
• Cherry picker trucks picking up employees from their homes during 
blizzards in order to ensure that there were enough operator, etc., to 
handle customer calls. 
• Armed security guards hired, windows boarded up and sleeping cots 
brought in to the Customer Billing and Operator Services Centers in 
order to protect and house employees during the Chicago riots of 1968, 
again to ensure service. 
My training class friends and I would compare notes, astounded by some of 
the stories and the years of service that we had heard. I know of one women who 
has 38 years service with AT&T and is 55 years old. In addition, almost every 
company publication contained a story of superhuman effort in the face of adversity. 
Just a few examples are: 
• The story of Angus MacDonald a lineman photographed wearing 
snowshoes and patrolling on foot the New York--Boston--Maine telephone 
line during the Great Blizzard of 1888 
• The story of Cliff Bannister, a supervisor in Mesquite, Texas, who found 
an abandoned baby left out in the cold and saved its life 43 
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• The story of Vivian Wing an AT&T operator in El Monte, California, Who 
received a call from a small plane that had lost all electrical power. She 
connected the pilot with he airports control tower an stayed on the line 
relaying communication between the two until the plane safely landed.44 
Much has been written regarding the business, technological and financial 
impact, both long and short range, regarding the AT & T divestiture. A great part of 
the success and history of AT&T was based on the people of AT&T, a fact that was 
widely advertised and acknowledges. However, particularly as a management 
employee of AT&T, I felt , suspected and observed that the emotional needs, the 
human factor was ignored during divestiture and in the subsequent downsizings, 
right sizings and re-engineering that took place. The human factor that had heavily 
contributed to its success had not been addressed. I believe that this occurred out 
of ignorance on the part of the executive s not out of design. I believe that Tunstall 
and his counterparts thought that the employee force would emotional "roll with the 
punches" as they had with any and every other change that had previously come 
along. They were not prepared for the reactions that resulted form the demise of 
what employees felt was their fundamental core of employment - lifetime security. 
Nonetheless, I observed that a corporate system that fostered a culture with a 
deep rooted sense of family had in the long run emotionally let down its own family. 
43Jon Mellor, "Long May He Run",Focus Magazine, for and about the peope of AT&T, 
Febry 1992, 41. 
44Jon Mellor, "A Wing and A Prayer", Focus Magazine, for and about the people of 
AT&T, Juary, 1992,42. 
CHAPTERS 
EFFECTS OF DIVESTITIJRE 
The Human Side of Divestiture 
Here are some examples of how AT&T employees felt about divestiture at 
the time that it was happening ( (1983 -1984). The following quotes were taken 
from a variety of video interviews that I found in the AT&T Video Tape Archives. 
"Uncertainty caused a lot of stress, it was a very emotional, like a divorce, it 
was a separation of close friends." 
"AT&T was a way of life - not just a job or place to work. As of May, 1984, 
Exxon become the largest company in the world."49 
"Ninety percent of the employees think the Bell System is a good company. 
It has low turnover. It's an era of a new worker - 'he wants to understand what is 
going". More than half of employee's morale is sinking."50 
49"Breaking Up Is Hard T Do", PBS, May 1984, AT&T video library, archives. 




"There's a lot of uncertainty and frustration. Will I have a job? What's going 
to haopen ~ nxiety built up over tirne "51 
"AT&T had incredible 'espirit d' corps· cemented with a service mentality and 
sense of family and of doing a public service. Divestiture has been about breaking a 
family apart. Breaking up colleagues and friends. Lots of pain."52 
"They don't care about the lives they're screwing up. Why are they 
breaking up something that is good? This company did a lot for this country. Judge 
Green screwed the company. Divestiture brought nothing to employees - only 
heartache."53 
We can also be a world-leading company in our humanity with all employees. 
We used to be. We have had a steady stream of employee attitude surveys to deal 
with the morale problem. However, those surveys deal with statistics, not people. 
Often we end up shortcutting the dignity of work. How often do we look beyond our 
jobs to the human dimensions of our work? Let's be a reminder to all too dig down 
deep and rediscover the principles that promote the dignity of work. "54 
51 "Breaking Up is Hard To Do", PBS, May 1984, AT&T Video Archives. 
52Ibid. 
53Ibid. 
54 D. Torrell, employee letter to the editor, Focus Magazine, for and about the 
people of AT&T, March 14, 1989. 
"By closing more offices and laying off workers, AT&T is destroying employee 
morale" said Jim Irvine a CWA Vice President. He believes the quality of service w1uld 
decline as a result."45 
"AT & T workers are angry and fed up with years of abuse and are mobilizing 
to fight back." Managers have been calling workers in to their offices and telling them 
that layoffs and closings would be announced on March 4, and alarming people in 
offices that won't even be affected. All of this was done before the Company met 
with the union to explain their plans. CWA represents 127,999 union represented 
AT&T workers nationwide."56 
Changing Corporate Climate and Labor Force 
There is no doubt that the AT&T corporate culture had to change as a result 
of the divestiture and increased competitive pressure. Neither corporation's 
leadership nor its employees, stockholders, customer, or suppliers were either 
prepared nor willing to accept this change. However, eventually even the most 
conservative opposition had to not only accept , but embrace the changing times as a 
matter of survival. Embracing the change meant you could then take some control 
and ownership of the process instead of being its victim. 
Morton Bahr, President of the Communication Workers of America (CWA) in 
1988 said: 
5545John J> Keller and Christopher Wians, Wall Street Journal, 29 March 1990,pA4. 
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It is the union's objective that every employee be guaranteed lifetime 
employment, if the employee is willing to be retrained as technology changes 
iobs and. where there is absolutely no other alternative, relocate We have t'.:' 
recognize that n wiil be increasingly difficult to come out of high school. go to 
work, stay 30 or 35 years in the same location, and retire. Technology is 
changing every year three to five years. We're emphasizing with employers 
that we're interested in partnership. The work ethic that made this nation 
successful seems to be on the downgrade, and we've got to overcome that. 57 
"The Company is becoming more creative, too We're learning to take risks. 
We're learning that just because AT&T did it in the past doesn't mean we 
can't change and try a new direction.use For AT&T this meant a new way of 
doing business and teaching employees and customers a new way of lift. This 
process was to be a continually evolving and experimental stage. Over the 
next ten years there would be a lot of stumbling and growing pains along the 
way for everyone involved. 
During the 1991 demise of AT&T Computer Systems as a result of the NCR 
merger and the elimination of approximately 6,000 jobs , AT&T introduced career 
support programs, including counseling service, job retraining and up to eight months 
for managers to find new jobs within the Company and out placement help for people 
who seek employment outside AT&T, efforts that had not been present during 
divestiture. 
The Company provided career centers that offered workshops on coping 
with change and using AT& T's internal job transfer systems. Workshops also included 
career goals setting, resume development, interviewing skills, and financial planning. 
All of these efforts were a direct result of the painful lesson that was learned 
through divestiture. Downsizing is always ugly, but at least there were lessons that 
were learned and applied. The corporation was definitely moving forward. AT&T's 
management had learned the hard way and going forward know that it need to: 
continue to invest in employees' training and development and must encourage and 
57 Laura W. Haywood, Focus Magazine, 13 September 1988,7. 
s8Focus Ma~azine, AT&T Publication, 14 February 1989, 13. 
reward a new operating style that en:::ourages openness, employee involvement, risk 
taking and above all else. that demands that we focus first arc las! o:: cu~ 
customers. 
Another challenge is the task of building a qualified work force in light of 
the predicted shortage of qualified labor in the 1990's. Two things are 
essential. The first is listening to employees and understanding their 
concerns. The second is to be willing to innovate and to be open to new ways 
of managing and to the possibilities offered by alliances with important players 
-- such as the unions. When you are dealing with the American labor force, 
what worked 30 years ago, or maybe even 10 or 5 years ago, won't work 
today. 
We must compete for talented employees as fiercely as we now compete 
for customer's business. Even after we succeed in this talent search, that 
does not mean permanent, lifetime agreement between employer and 
employee. The new breed of employee today changes the type of work they 
do five times over the course of their careers. Even those employees who do 
stay with AT&T, the nature of their work will constantly evolve because of our 
rapidly changing technology. 
Unlike their parents, new employees do not necessarily link their personal 
success to the success of our business, or any business. People these days 
need more self fulfillment. Their personal emphasis is on their own professional 
identity rather than the identity of the company. Another trait is a suspicion 
of authority. We have a generation of workers who are reluctant to accept 
direction unquestioningly, who simply cannot and will not function under the 
old management model of high supervision and low trust. Given the labor 
shortage that is predicted, the most talent will certainly not have to put up 
with authoritarian management. 
The point is that people coming in to the business these days arrive with 
quite different values and expectations that most of us grew up wit. What is 
called for is a fundamental change in the way we manage people and in our 
relationships with the labor force. 59 
"No one can make a pledge of no more downsizing. We will continue to do 
everything possible to minimize downsizing in the future."60 This was not what anyone 
wanted to hear, however, it is an honest appraisal of the situation, not only within 
s9Bill Ketchum, "AT&T Labor Relations in the 1990's", Executive Speech Unpublsihed in teh 
Public Domain, 30 May 1990,AT&T Archives. 
AT&T, but in the overall U.S. corporate culture. This is evidenced by the changes at 
other major corporations such as IBM KODAK, GM. etc. 
Divestiture proved to be a spark of change. "AT&T entered new and 
unregulated markets, such as data processing and computers, and eventually the 
credit card industry unlike airline deregulation, divestiture has truly caused price 
cuts and quality improvements."61 
AT&T has learned the following tough lessons in how to deal with downsizing. 
These lessons and the resulting processes means: 
Steering employees through a four step process: Giving them counseling on 
how to deal with the loss of life time colleagues; training them in new skills; 
"empowering" them to use those skills without turning to an over protective boss or 
an all encompassing rule book, and finally rewarding them for making the transition .62 
In an 1988 interview, Bob Allen, President and CEO of AT&T told the world 
that: 
AT&T people must have a passion for winning in the market place. That 
requires passionate dedication to satisfying customers. I'm calling on our people to 
apply their talents, knowledge and skills to make AT&T the global leader in enabling 
customers to reap the benefits of information technology. I want them to challenge 
some of the old "sacred cows" of the business. I believe in competition. That's cone 
way it works. It helps change your mind and your culture. We have a very talented 
reservoir of people. I think many of our people are inhibited or constrained by our 
culture or organization. They lack a common philosophy or understanding about their 
60Ibid. 
6lStanley Welland, "Life After Divestiture; Price Cuts, Quality Improvements, and more", 
Information Week. 26 January 1992,48. 
62Claudia Deutsch.New York Times. 3 June 1990, Sect.3;Part 2,25. 
57 
role in the business. I want all of our people to feel they can unleash themselves and 
focus on winning in the marketplace.63 
Morale Issues 
The problem is a fundamental one; Employer and employee have always 
shared an unwritten pact: "If I do an good job for you, you'll take care of me." No 
more, to survive, they must keep one step ahead of technology, marketing trends and 
the company's balance sheet.64 
The message employees hear is: 'You're expendable. Your job hinges on the 
next contract. You're less likely to get promoted. Even if you do a good job for us, 
you may be let go." The days of the 25-30 year career with one company, a gold 
watch and a secure future are over, companies tell you. Companies shed people like 
snakes shed skin, only the corporate types do their molting at every blip on the 
quarterly profits chart. 65 
Everyday we see stress manifest itself in increased absenteeism, escalation 
of violence in the workplace, and especially in rising health care costs. The feverish 
pace most corporations have set for themselves is perhaps the largest contributor 
to workers' high anxiety levels.66 These morale problems and dilemmas are intensified 
within AT&T because of the deeply rooted culture that has existed since 1885. 
63Don Ferenci, Focus, 22 November 1988, 22. 
64Bob Bellinger, "Professional Pipeline", eelectronic Engineering Times, 7 January 1991. 
65Ibid. 
66Michael R. Losey, "Managing Stress in the Workplace" Modem Office Technology. 
February 1991, v36 n2 p48. 
CHAPTER6 
SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF INTERVIEWS 
As previously mentioned, I interviewed 18 people in order to collect and 
analyze current and former employees' emotional reactions to divestiture and 
subsequent downsizing. The questions were geared to solicit responses regarding 
how they felt they had been treated. 
The following three questions provides what I consider to be the most 
insightful, heartfelt and emotionally charged responses. Each questions is followed 
with a brief analysis of the responses and with some direct quotes from the subjects. 
I believe the selected quotes characterize the general reaction of the subjects. 
1 . What expectations did you have of the company when you 
started to work for the Bell System (AT&T)? 
Analysis 
Employees expected life time employment - job security in exchange for their 
loyalty. That loyalty meant no one represented the Bell System better than 
its employees in the community. For example, that loyalty was what 
motivated 850 Southwestern Bell employees to restore telephone service to 
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18,000 phones within 72 hours after a tornado demolished 15 miles of 
downtown Topeka, Kansas, in 1966.67 
Responses 
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" I guess I expected the world. I can do the job and be rewarded. I expected 
to make big bucks, promotions and a good career." 
"Great company to work for - very technical. I expected a long-term career, 
to make the supper echelons of management." 
"To have my initiative rewarded both with promotions and financially." 
"I was told in every six month review, 'if you do a good job we'll boost you 
along'." 
"She said they would pay me well - I would get a series of raises and good 
benefits, that it was a very long-term and very secure company." 
"I figured I would work here the rest of my life." 
"I expected to have a career in terms of somebody sits down with you and 
plans your assignments, figures out where your next move is, etc." 
07 H. M. Boettinger, The Telephone Book, ( Stearns Publishing Ltd. 1983). 
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"Promotions and mobility." 
2 . How did things change for you after divestiture? 
Analysis 
The corporation became totally focused on the process of divestiture and in 
successfully executing and implementing the break up. The human element 
was ignored. Management counted on the "courage, initiative, good 
judgment, and resourcefulness• of its employees to get the corporation 
through the process. However, they failed to provide and care for the spirit 
and lifeblood that had created and was the Bell System. 
Responses 
"Job security - it was gone. A lot of wariness - did I make the right decision 
about either going to New Jersey Bell or with AT&T? Gradually feeling more 
and more defensive. The demise of people and their organizations. That was 
the scariest part, they weren't necessarily getting rid of people because of 
poor performance. They just drew a line and said we no longer need this 
group of people. 
"Totally unaware and uncaring of the emotional impact that this tenacious 
and somewhat rocky business has these days. All I am is a number. I don't feel 
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that there's any compassion at AT&T for it's employees any longer. 
Recognizing that I'm a human being with feelings, emotions, and a personal life 
that exists after 5 p.m. I give the company my all during working hours .and 
many, many hours beyond. 
"I think they're determined to be a global leader and I don't think they're going 
to take any crap from either employees or the outside competition." 
"It because a very chaotic environment. The environment got even more 
competitive. Somewhat ruthless in terms of how they managed their business 
and their labor force. Darwinistic - if you're not such a good salesperson, 
etc., you're gonna die earlier -- if you're the best at what do you, you're 
going to be the last personal to die." 
"My self-esteem was really shattered. To have someone come in and say 
you're no longer the boss, but you can stay here or go over there and then 
retire. and when people who had helped you earn your self-esteem see you 
coming, they turn their backs and pretend to be working or something - then 
you say they not only didn't care about me as their boss, but now as a human 
being they don't want to bother with me. There must be some green stuff or 
something on my face that I don't see and that won't come off. During that 
time I never went to lunch with anyone. I went to lunch alone everyday." 
"Every man for himself" mentality. I read at the time an article a sort of top 
executives perspective for the next few years - and it never mentioned 
62 
people. They're driven by number. It's really even now one person kicking the 
next person, kicking the next person, etc. 11 
3 . What four words would you use to describe AT&T? 
Analysis 
The corporate goals are focused on the bottom line the company is perceived 
as blundering its way toward that goal because of lack of proper planning. In 
addition employees feel that upper management does not listen to the 
suggestions and comments from "front line" employees. Employees feel the 
"powers that be• do not value or take into consideration the experience and 
wealth of knowledge that they apply when these suggestions are made. The 
corporation is viewed as focused on the ultimate goal regardless of anyone or 
anything. 
Responses 
"Large, fickle, sharp (smart, intelligent employees)." 
"Profit oriented." 
"Conservative, large, slow, hopeful." 
·Analytical, ruthless, focused. 11 
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"Ready, Fire, Aim." 
Final Analysis of Interviews 
There are two different types of employee groups at AT&T, the first one is 
the group that was employed with AT&T well before divestiture. This first group can 
be generally categorized as having had less formal education, working themselves up 
through the ranks from positions such as operators, installers, etc., to various 
management levels, having a multitude of family and close friends employed with AT&T, 
and formerly employed with one of the Bell Operating Companies. 
This first group had expectations that had been built up over 100 years of 
AT&T's history. Succinctly, the corporate culture had promoted an exchange of 
"benefits" with these employees. In exchange for loyalty the AT&T system would 
provide job security. But it is important to define "loyalty" and "job security". 
Loyalty can best be explained by way of how employees were treated prior 
to divestiture. The Bell System was called "Ma Bell" for a reason. It was a benign, 
caring totally encompassing organization. Prior to divestiture nepotism was 
encouraged by the Company. Whole families worked for the Bell System. It was not 
unusual to find parents, their children, in-laws, nieces, nephews, spouses and 
grandchildren employed with the Bell System. As a matter of fact, the parents of the 
Chairman of the Board at the time of the divestiture, Charlie Brown, both had worked 
for the Bell System. It was unnecessary for the Bell System to spend either the time 
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or money to advertise for jobs in order to fill the openings. This nepotism also served 
to strengthen employees' ties to the Company. 
Employees never had to concern themselves with a career path, because 
their immediate supervisor or manager took care of that for them. Employees were 
told by their managers what and when their next promotion would take place and to 
what position, and in what organization it would be. Supervisors told employees what 
classes to take and when to take a particular class. Employees never had a need to 
write a resume. In most cases, the immediate supervisor or manager submitted the 
employee for the job and did all of the necessary lobbying. In essence, employees 
were led by the hand, the generous parent, Ma Bell, took care of everything. 
What the Bell System received from all of this benevolence was greater 
productivity. Employees had more time to spend at their jobs and with greater 
dedication when someone else, their supervisor or manager, was looking out for them. 
This is where the issue of loyalty came in. In exchange for all of this kindliness, the Bell 
System expected individuals to care as much about the Company, as the Company 
did about the individual. In truth, it was more than an expectation, it was a non-verbal 
agreement. As an employee, the moment you accepted and benefited from the Bell 
System's matriarchal amity, you now owed them. What was interesting is that 
employees were not beholden to an abstract corporate entity, so much as to other 
peers, friends and family. They were the ones that expected you to produce in 
exchange for their collective job security. Ma Bell, the one who had taken you into 
her warm, secure and embracing arms, had a face that was a composite and a collage 
of all of fellow employees, friends and family. The line that may have once have 
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separated an individual's career interests from the corporation's interests had 
blurred to the point where one could not be differentiated from the other. The Bell 
System's cry and banner of universal service became that of all employees'. . 
This loyalty was enforced on a regular basis. As I mentioned in an earlier 
chapter, there were endless stories and company newsletters that reinforced 
excellence of service in the face of any and every kind of adversity. 
The second group of employees were those that can be categorized as 
having been hired approximately two years prior to divestiture, during and since 
divestiture. This second group had other characteristics such as, undergraduate 
and graduate degrees prior to being hired, no family or friends that had previously 
worked with the Bell System, no expectations of lifelong employment. This group was 
hired directly into the management ranks. 
This group was wooed with illusions of empowerment, professionalism, career 
opportunities, bleeding edge technology and all of the dreams that comes to mind 
when the phrase "the world's largest corporation" is dangled in front of them. 
As you can see from the interviews, the job reality for both of these groups 
turned out to be completely the opposite of the job expectations that had been 
initially created by AT&T. 
For the first group, divestiture changed the rules of the game completely. 
Overnight, the rug of job security was pulled out from under them. Everyone 
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understands the reality of the business world in the 1980's and 1990's. However, 
what was not addressed and in many ways continues to not be addressed is the 
emotions of the workforce. Emotions are part of the human element. Everyone 
acknowledges the trauma people undergo when a death occurs in a family, or a 
serious illness or a divorce, etc. The AT&T Divestiture was in effect for these 
employees, the people, a death, a divorce, a serious illness, a new culture and then 
some, all rolled up into one. It was much more than just unemployment, it was the loss 
of a parent, friends, the uprooting of their way of life and culture. The AT&T 
Divestiture was an emotional trauma for all of these employees. Not only was it 
losses, but new ways of doing things with no bible or new rules. However, the 
corporate expectations of the employees remaining the same. In mid-1994, during a 
casual conversation with a woman who has just been terminated due to downsizings, 
she expressed what I believe are the emotional needs of employees rather eloquently. 
As she quietly cried, she chokingly said: 
"I worked for this company for 22-1/2 years and all they did was throw 
this termination package at me. For the last year and a half my group was 
under intense pressure to reduce expenses and bring up revenue. I spent 
sleepless nights trying to come up with new ideas to meet our goals and I 
wasn't the only one. Excuse my language, but the damn director who is in 
New Jersey couldn't even get on the speakerphone or make a damn 
conference call to just tell us 'thank you' or to say 'I know you tried your 
best, but we still had to close down your office.' Then when we went to the 
Resource Center, they're supposed to help us write resumes and find jobs, 
the first thing the job counselor there said to us on the first day was 'The 
Company doesn't owe you anything', well excuse me, but it does. It owes me 
to treat me like a human being. The people who are left that are supposed to 
help us, treat us like dogs, like we're lepers. This is what we get after 22-1/2 
years. What do you think the likelihood is of finding another job within the 
Company if our own group doesn't want to have anything to do with us. It's 
not like I'm a terrible person or was a rotten employee. I always got good 
appraisals, but this is what it has come down to." 
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The second group felt that they were hired by the industry leader to do 
great things and subsequently felt that great things would happen to them and their 
careers. From the interviews I was able to garner that they felt they were courted 
and hired as thoroughbreds but put to work like plowhorses. This group did not 
expect to be lead by the hand; however, they did expect career opportunities. 
Instead, they found those in influential positions who harbored great pain about the 
past and also managed ala the old culture. Subsequently by "retiring in place" these 
managers diminished this second group's opportunities and creativity. This second 
group is experiencing divestiture culture shock waves and corporate culture clash 
between these two dissimilar groups even ten years later. 
Conclusion 
With each new downsizing, AT&T appears to be learning and applying valuable 
lessons that they have painfully experienced with each previous downsizing. For 
example, in the 1994 surplus declaration they have announced (25,000 by January 
1, 1995) they are providing job posting systems, career placement alternatives, 
career transition support and flexible force management programs that will allow a 
business unit to address the force imbalance using voluntary, involuntary or combined 
voluntary//involuntary separation programs. Hal Burlingame, Senior Vice President 
of Human Resources has written and distributed a memo that asks all managers "for 
your personal commitment to help address this major challenge: to assure that the 
current force adjustments are handled with as much demonstrated leadership care 
as possible, and with a determination that all people of AT&T will feel treated with 
fairness, candor and compassion." 
Even though as a corporation it has made significant strides in the area of 
true concern for the employee as a human being, they still have not been able to find 
a method that allows employees-particularly longer-term employees-a 
constructive manner for expressing the emotional "baggage" they have carried 
around with them since divestiture in 1984. 
In late 1993, early 1994 AT&T created a new policy called THE COMMON 
BOND. This policy asks every employee to commit to "guide our decisions and 
behavior by : 1) Respect for Individuals; 2) Dedication to Helping Customers; 3) 
Highest Standard of Integrity; 4) Innovation and; 5) Teamwork. In particular, with this 
formal attention to respect for the individual, AT&T has officially gone on record 
recognizing and addressing the emotional needs of employees. 
The people of AT&T have gone through a painful rites of passage. Other 
corporations can learn from AT&T's decade of trials and errors and save themselves 
considerable financial and human expense. In the past two years it has been 
apparent that in corporate America, other companies have learned and are still 
learning the mechanics of dealing with corporate mergers, massive downsizings and 
reorganizations. By the mechanics I mean providing "at risk" employees with training 
and resources for finding new jobs or learning new skills. The lesson that still needs to 
be learned is that of respect for the individual, which is a lesson that AT&T is still 
struggling to learn not only in theory, but in practice. I believe the most valuable 
lesson has been to not take for granted what I think is the most valuable asset, the 
human asset. 
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Personally this thesis has served as a catharsis for all of the emotional 
baggage I carried insofar as my experiences with the AT&T Divestiture and its impact 
on me and the people with whom I came into contact. What I have learned in 
assembling all of the data for this thesis is that regardless of the environment, when 
it comes to dealing with people, nothing can replace respect for the individual nor the 
strength of its impact. 
APPENDIX 1 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. How long were you with AT&T/Bell? 
2. How did you come to work with the Bell System? 
3. Give me a brief work history of your time and experience with AT&T/Bell. 
4. What expectations did you have when you started to work for the Bell 
System? 
5. What in particular was said or done to encourage those expectations? 
6. Were any of these expectations met? 
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7. Did you have any family or friends that worked for the Bell System when or 
prior to your joining the company? 
8. What role, if any, did they play in your decision to join the company? 
10. How long do you now expect to work for AT&T? 
1 1 . How did things change for you with the divestiture? 
1 2 Were you ever told you were at risk? 
1 3. How did you feel when you were told you were at risk? 
1 4. In retrospect, how could it have been handled differently? 
15. How do you feel you've been treated at AT&T? 
1 6. How do you feel about life at AT&T? 
1 7. Would you continue to buy AT&T products and services? 




I am giving my permission to be voluntarily interviewed as part of the research for a 
Graduate degree thesis being written by Norma L Gonzalez. 
I understand that only by first name, or whatever name I choose, will be used in the 
interview. I also understand that the interview will be audio taped. 
The thesis is entitled: "The Emotional Impact of the AT&T Divestiture and Subsequent 
Downsizings Upon Former and Current Employees." 
Interviewee Signature: 
Interviewer Signature: 
Norma L Gonzalez 
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